The financial crisis in S, M and L: three very different countries respond similarly by Rajeev Bhaskar & Yadav Gopalan
L
ast September and October were critical 
for the United States in the ongoing 
financial crisis.  Almost daily, there were 
announcements of mergers—and fail-
ures—of major financial institutions, and 
huge corporations across many industries 
pleaded for government help.  In response, 
federal lending and other assistance pro-
grams popped up like mushrooms after a 
downpour, offering hundreds of billions  
of dollars in aid.
While many Americans were shaken 
by the problems in the private sector, they 
were just as anxious about the response 
from the federal government.  Although the 
response was unprecedented in many ways, 
it’s important to know that the U.S. wasn’t 
taking such action in a vacuum.  At the 
same time that the crisis was snowballing in 
the United States, it was spreading around 
the world.  And government leaders in other 
countries were responding with similarly 
bold and unprecedented actions.
This article examines the crisis and 
response last fall in a sampling of countries 
—a small one (Iceland,) a medium one 
(the United Kingdom) and a large one (the 
United States).  While each country had 
somewhat different problems and different 
institutions to deal with those problems, all 
responded with forceful action and major 
intervention to keep their financial systems 
from a complete collapse.
The U.S. SiTUaTion
The U.S. economy is the largest in the 
world.  In 2007, GDP was $13.8 trillion, 
approximately five times larger than that of  
the U.K. and 708 times larger than that of Ice- 
land.  The U.S. financial sector represented 
8.9 percent of the total economy in 2007.
The turbulent financial market condi-
tions in the fall of 2008, along with the 
ongoing financial crisis, have their roots in 
the subprime crisis dating back to mid-
2007.  When financial institutions suffered 
significant losses to their subprime mort-
gage portfolios, investor confidence in the 
credit markets was shaken.  The ensuing 
year-long credit and liquidity crisis over-
flowed onto the global arena in September 
2008.  This period can be characterized by 
severe liquidity contraction in the credit 
markets, mounting losses and failures of 
financial institutions, as well as the threat 
of insolvency to many other financial 
institutions.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two 
housing government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs), were among the first of the large 
troubled institutions that the government 
aided.  Falling house prices and rising 
foreclosures led to significant losses.  The 
two GSEs saw their stock prices plummet 
more than 90 percent over the year.  More 
bad news came when Lehman Brothers filed 
for bankruptcy protection Sept. 15, rattling 
the markets across the globe.  AIG (Ameri-
can International Group) was the next large 
financial services company in trouble.  On 
Sept. 16, credit rating agencies downgraded 
AIG, requiring it to post collateral on its 
credit default swaps.  This led to a liquidity 
crisis for AIG; it was unable to generate the 
billions of dollars in cash required to meet 
its obligations.  Next was the failure on Sept. 
26 of the largest thrift in the U.S., Washing-
ton Mutual, which had assets of more than 
$300 billion.
The U.S. has a complex and diverse 
financial regulatory structure, consisting of 
numerous federal and state agencies with 
different roles, jurisdictions and objec-
tives.  Though many government agencies 
have played some role in the response to 
the financial crisis, there have been four 
major players:  the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), the Federal Deposit Insur-




The FHFA was created July 30, 2008, by 
the merger of the Federal Housing Finance 
Board (FHFB) and the Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).  
The new agency oversees the secondary 
mortgage markets.  Soon after its forma-
tion, the FHFA nationalized the two housing 
giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The 
government, in effect, invested in them, took 
control of their boards and managements, 
and restricted their activities.  These actions 
reassured market participants that Fannie 
and Freddie still had the necessary funds to 
buy mortgage loans and would continue to 
play an important role in providing liquidity 
to the U.S. mortgage market. 
The FDIC
The FDIC is an independent agency of 
the federal government that has a mandate 
to maintain financial stability by insur-
ing deposits, examining and supervis-
ing financial institutions, and managing 
receiverships.  Through legislative action, 
the FDIC’s deposit insurance limit was 
raised to $250,000 from $100,000 through 
December 2009 in order to provide security 
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the financial crisis.  The FDIC, through its 
rule-making powers, initiated a temporary 
liquidity guarantee program that guarantees 
newly issued senior unsecured debt of banks, 
thrifts and certain holding companies and 
that provides insurance coverage of noninter-
est bearing deposit transaction accounts.
The Fed
The Federal Reserve, the central bank of 
the United States, is independent from the 
fiscal authority (the Treasury).  The role of 
the central bank is to foster a sound banking 
system and a healthy economy.  The Fed is 
different from the central banks of Iceland 
and the U.K. in that the U.S. central bank 
is the only one that is also a regulator and 
supervisor of banks.
As early as August 2007, when the mar-
kets began showing financial strain, the  
Fed lowered its discount rate by 50 basis 
points.  This was followed by a rapid easing 
of monetary policy.  The target fed funds 
rate was lowered from 5.25 percent in 
September 2007 to a range of 0-0.25 percent 
in December 2008.  The easing helped in 
lowering short-term lending rates, yet activ-
ity in the credit and securitization markets 
remained clogged. 
The Fed has also provided an enormous 
amount of liquidity (close to $1 trillion) to 
private institutions to restore the normal 
functioning of credit.  The Fed’s actions have 
included direct lending to banks and primary 
security dealers, and have provided liquidity 
directly to borrowers and investors in key 
credit markets.  At the height of the crisis, 
the Fed provided an initial loan of up to $85 
billion to the beleaguered AIG to meet its 
short-term needs.  To help maintain liquid-
ity in worldwide financial markets—which 
are largely denominated in dollars—the Fed 
has initiated swap lines with several central 
banks around the world.
The Treasury
The Treasury Department is the execu-
tive agency of the government responsible 
for promoting economic prosperity and 
ensuring the financial security of the United 
States.   Through its bureaus (the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Office 
of Thrift Supervision), the Treasury regulates 
and supervises depository institutions.  
Among the most far-reaching actions 
taken by the government last fall was the 
Treasury’s $700 billion financial services 
stabilization package, formally known as 
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program).  
a Timeline of the events of Fall 2008 for U.S., U.K. and Iceland
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  
nationalized.
Lehman Brothers files for  
bankruptcy protection.
Sept. 15
Robin Radaetz holds a sign in front of the Lehman 
Brothers headquarters Sept. 15 in New York.  Lehman 
Brothers, a 158-year-old investment bank choked by 
the credit crisis and falling real estate values, filed for 
Chapter 11 protection in the biggest bankruptcy filing 
ever and said it was trying to sell off key business units. 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. 
speaks during a news conference 
in Washington on Sept. 7 on the 
nationalization of mortgage giants 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Sept. 16
Federal Reserve 
aids AIG with  
$85 billion loan.
In a bid to save financial 
markets and economy from 
further turmoil, the Federal 
Reserve said Sept. 16 it would 
provide up to $85 billion in an 
emergency, two-year loan to 




Bank of America buys Merrill 
Lynch for $50 billion.
Bank of America bought Merrill Lynch in  
a $50 billion deal that created a bank  
offering everything from fixed-income  
trading to credit-card lending. 
(AP PHoTo/MARY ALTAFFeR)
Sept. 7
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assets, especially mortgage backed securi-
ties (MBS), and to provide capital to banks 
that had severe liquidity needs.  Between 
the creation of TARP and its implementa-
tion, however, the thrust of the program 
morphed into one of recapitalizing financial 
institutions.  As of Jan. 6, 2009, the Trea-
sury had invested a total of $187.5 billion 
in senior preferred shares in 214 financial 
institutions; $40 billion to AIG under the 
Significant Failing Institutions Program; 
$19.4 billion to the auto industry; $20 billion 
to Citigroup as part of the Targeted Invest-
ment Program; and $20 billion for a Federal 
Reserve consumer-finance program.  The 
grand total was $282.9 billion. 
The SiTUaTion in iCeLand
Until fairly recently, Iceland’s two major 
industries had been fishing and tourism.  The 
government had tight control over many sec-
tors, including banking.  Earlier this decade, 
Iceland’s government privatized many sec-
tors of the economy by selling off state assets, 
including its banking institutions.
Following privatization between 2001 
and 2003, Iceland’s commercial banks grew 
tremendously.  In addition, some banks 
used debt, primarily denominated in euros, 
to finance aggressive expansion overseas.  
Figure 1 (on the next page) shows the speed 
at which Iceland’s banks issued credit and 
marketable securities; it also shows the 
growth in their deposits.
The sector was dominated by three main 
banks: Glitnir, Landsbanki and Kaupthing.  
All three institutions expanded internation-
ally and had become savings havens for 
Europeans who wanted to take advantage of 
Iceland’s high interest rates.
Right before the crisis, the sector’s col-
lective assets had ballooned to roughly 
eight times the country’s overall GDP.
1  
Furthermore, the banks’ stocks had risen 
to comprise roughly 75 percent of Iceland’s 
stock market value.
2
Glitnir, the third largest financial institu-
tion in Iceland, had borrowed heavily for 
aggressive expansion abroad.  On Oct. 15, the 
bank had roughly a600 million in maturing 
debt; in addition, it needed to pay out a150 
million as part of a loan it arranged with 
Bayerische Landesbank, a German bank.  
Due to a precipitous drop in the value of the 
currency, as well as the central bank’s insuf-
ficient foreign reserves, Glitnir did not have 
the cash necessary to pay down its debt, as 
well as to pay its loan to Bayerische Landes-
bank.  (The German government eventually 
structured a rescue package for Bayerische 
Landesbank.)
Landsbanki, the second largest bank, 
was a particular magnet for foreign savers, 
especially for British savers.  In the wake 
of Glitnir’s collapse, British depositors 
withdrew roughly $272 million in deposits 
from Landsbanki over one weekend, causing 
severe liquidity problems for the bank.
For Kaupthing, Iceland’s largest bank, 
problems arose when the Icelandic govern-
ment guaranteed a higher level of deposits 
for Icelanders but not for foreigners.  As  
a result, the U.K. government invoked  
anti-terror laws to freeze Kaupthing’s for-
eign assets.
institutional Structure  
and Policy Responses
The main organizations that orches-
trated Iceland’s response to its crisis were 
its central bank (Sedlabanki Islands), its 
fiscal authority (the Finance Ministry) and 
its financial regulatory body (the Finan-
cial Supervisory Authority, also known as 
FME, a derivation from its Icelandic name).  
Unlike in the United States, Iceland’s banks, 
as well as its financial markets as a whole, 
are regulated by a single authority, the FME. 
Its authorities and responsibilities are 
Morgan Stanley and Goldman 
Sachs become bank holding 
companies.
Sept. 21
Britain’s biggest mortgage lender, 
HBOS, is taken over by Lloyds TSB 
in a £12 billion deal.
Sept. 17
Halifax Bank of Scotland Chief executive Andy Hornby, 
left, shakes hands with Lloyds TSB Chief executive 
eric Daniels, right, while Lloyds Chairman Victor Blank 
looks on after the merger was agreed to Sept. 17 in 
London.  Blank said that the prime minister had told 
him the day before that competition rules would be set 
aside to make way for the merger.
Sept. 19
U.S. Treasury secretary announces $700 stabilization plan.
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., speaks to reporters after members of Congress 
met with SeC Chairman Chris Cox, second from left, and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, 
third from left, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Ber-
nanke, right, on Sept. 18 in Washington.  Democrats began the week by blaming President 
Bush for the financial crisis and said it was his job to fix it.  But as the disarray became a 
meltdown and the entire u.S. economy was at stake, they pledged to work with Republicans 
on a rescue that could cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.  
Late Sunday, Sept. 21, the Federal Reserve 
granted Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, 
the country’s last two major investment 
banks, approval to change their status to 
bank holding companies. 
(AP PHoTo / JoHN STILLWeLL, PooL)
(AP PHoTo/LAuReN VICToRIA BuRke)
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United States.
3
Iceland’s central bank is primarily 
charged with price stability.  It achieves this 
by controlling its interbank policy interest 
rate to affect the cost of borrowing.  The 
central bank also promotes financial stabil-
ity, maintains Iceland’s foreign reserves, 
manages public debt, and serves as public 
repository of economic data and statistics.
4  
Because of its small size and its isolated 
location, Iceland’s central bank kept inter-
est rates high in an effort to support the 
exchange value of its currency.
The Icelandic Finance Ministry is a 
department within the national govern-
ment.  The finance minister is usually 
an elected Member of Parliament.  The 
ministry’s objectives are to promote a stable 
economy, collect revenue on behalf of the 
government, administer the public debt 
and manage national finances.  Unlike its 
analogous department in the United States, 
the Treasury, the Icelandic Finance Ministry 
is not involved with any supervisory tasks.
The central bank, the FME and the 
Finance Ministry were all central to stabiliz-
ing Iceland’s banks.  Iceland’s currency lost 
tremendous value over the course of two 
months.  From September through October, 
the krona lost 20 percent versus the U.S. 
dollar and 17 percent versus the euro.  Thus, 
Glitnir’s krona-denominated assets made it 
difficult for the institution to pay off its debt.  
To compound the issue, the central bank 
could not properly function as the lender 
of last resort because of insufficient foreign 
currency reserves.  On Sept. 29, the FME 
helped resolve the issue with Glitnir Bank by 
acquiring a 75 percent stake in the bank, a 
stake valued at roughly $782 million.
5
One week later, on Oct.6, the government 
passed emergency laws enabling the FME to 
take over banks.  Through this legislation, 
Icelandic officials formally nationalized 
Landsbanki and Glitnir.
In the midst of the Landsbanki takeover, 
U.K. and Icelandic officials debated the fate 
of the British deposits at Icelandic banks.  
As a result of Iceland not being able to 
guarantee foreign deposits beyond set Euro-
pean limits, the U.K. invoked anti-terror 
legislation to freeze assets associated with 
Icelandic banks and transfer them to ING, 
a Dutch bank.  Due to the exodus of these 
deposits, Kaupthing was forced to submit to 
government takeover as well.
The FME then created three “new banks” 
to continue regular banking operation, 
while the “old banks” were kept in existence 
icelandic Banking and GdP Growth, 2000-2007
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Congress passes stabilization 
package, called the Troubled 
Assets Relief Program (TARP).
Financial crisis spreads 
widely across Europe.
Oct. 1
In this video image from APTN, the final vote 
tally is displayed after the Senate passed the 
economic Stabilization Act by a vote of 74-25 
on oct. 1.  The House passed it on oct. 3 and 
President Bush signed it within hours.
Sept. 29
(AP PHoTo/APTN)
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, center, 
gestures while speaking during a media 
conference at an emergency financial  
summit at the elysee Palace in Paris on  
oct. 4.  The global financial crisis is forcing 
the leaders of France, Britain, Germany and 
Italy to come together for an emergency 
summit in Paris.  Seated at left is German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, and at right is 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown. 
Sept. 26
Washington Mutual, with  
$307 billion in assets,  
becomes largest thrift failure.
In this April 8, 2008, photo, a closure notice hangs 
in the window of a Washington Mutual home loan 
center in Salt Lake City.  on Sept. 26, Washington 
Mutual, one of the nation’s largest banks, was 
seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and 
then sold to JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
(AP PHoTo/DouGLAS C. PIZAC, FILe)
(AP PHoTo/VIRGINIA MAYo)
Iceland takes  
control of Glitnir,  





16   The Regional Economist  |  april 2009as a mechanism to handle foreign deposits 
and assets, as well as any complex securi-
ties.  This marked the beginning of a period 
of recovery for Iceland’s banking system.  
Iceland also secured $2.07 billion in loans 
from Denmark, Norway, the Faroe Islands 
and Poland.  In addition, Iceland and the 
International Monetary Fund structured a 
$2.1 billion economic stabilization program, 
centered upon preventing further depre-
ciation of the Icelandic krona, developing 
a plan to restructure its banks as well as 
putting the country back on sound fiscal 
footing in the medium term.
The U.k. SiTUaTion
Like the quick rise of Iceland’s bank-
ing sector, the United Kingdom had also 
experienced an unprecedented growth in 
its financial sector, to the point at which 
it rivaled New York and Tokyo as a major 
center for finance.  By the time the U.K. 
economy started showing signs of weakness, 
in the summer of 2007, the financial services 
sector contributed roughly 32 percent 
toward the U.K. GDP.
6
The U.K.’s financial institutions began 
to show signs of strain much earlier than 
such institutions in Iceland or even in the 
United States.  In the fall of 2007, the U.K. 
experienced its first bank run in 141 years, 
with the flight of deposits from lender 
Northern Rock.  Compounding the issue, 
U.K. authorities resolved to take care of 
another institution, Bradford & Bingley.  
The nationalization of Northern Rock in 
early 2008 and of Bradford & Bingley’s 
mortgages in the fall of 2008 shook British 
markets.  This was compounded by the weak 
market reaction to the takeover by U.K. 
bank Lloyds TSB of another bank, HBOS.
In addition, spillovers from the turmoil 
in the U.S. markets affected the financial 
sector in London.  Many U.S. banks, broker-
ages and investment firms, including Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, had large 
operations in London.
institutional Structure  
and Policy Responses
The United Kingdom’s efforts to promote 
financial stability are anchored by three 
important institutions: the Bank of England, 
the Treasury and the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA).  The U.K.’s institutional 
structure is similar to Iceland’s.  The Bank 
of England sets monetary policy by control-
ling its main interbank policy interest rate.  
In addition, it has a mandate to promote 
financial stability.  The Bank of England 
also serves as a lender of last resort to the 
nation’s financial institutions.  The U.K. 
Treasury coordinates fiscal and economic 
policy on behalf of the government as a 
whole.  It carries out its fiscal policy objec-
tives by collecting tax revenue and manag-
ing government debt.  Through its goal of 
coordinating economic policy, the Treasury 
helps support broad economic growth.  
Unlike in the United States, the U.K.’s Trea-
sury is not involved in bank supervision. 
Despite their differing functions within 
the financial sector, the U.K. Treasury and 
the Bank of England worked closely together 
in forging a policy response.  On Oct. 8, the 
British government and the Bank of Eng-
land unveiled a three-part plan estimated to 
cost  £500 billion to help stabilize the finan-
cial system.
7  The first part of the plan called 
for a £50 billion recapitalization of Tier 1 
capital in the country’s financial institu-
tions.  An aggregated £25 billion would first 
be injected into the eight largest institutions, 
and an additional £25 billion would be used 
to recapitalize all other institutions.  The 
government would buy preferred stock or 
preferred interest bearing shares (PIBS) in 
these entities.  As a part of this package, 
the Treasury would assist in equity offer-
ings by these institutions.  Institutions, on 
U.S., U.K. and other countries  
cut interest rates.
Oct. 8
Icelandic bank Kaupthing 
is nationalized.
Oct. 8 Oct. 7 Oct. 10
U.K. government announces £500  
billion bank rescue package.
Demonstrators gather outside the Bank of england in  
London on oct. 10 to protest against the government’s 
bank rescue plan.  earlier in the week, the government  
announced it would provide debt guarantees of £250 
billion, short- term loans of £200 billion and a Treasury 
injection of £50 billion. 
A journalist in London reporting on the financial crisis holds up 
a newspaper with the headline “Too little, too late and too much 
faffing, say the traders.”  (“Faffing” is slang in the u.k. for 
“wasting time.”)  on oct. 8, six major central banks cut interest 
rates in a coordinated move to try to ease the effects of the 
global economic crisis.  The banks were those of the u.k., u.S., 
european union, Canada, Switzerland and Sweden.
(AP PHoTo/LeFTeRIS PITARAkIS)
(AP PHoTo/SANG TAN)
A protester speaks to the crowd outside 
the Central Bank of Iceland in Reykjavik on 
oct. 10 during a demonstration demanding 
the resignation of the chairman, David 
oddsson.  Iceland suspended trading on 
its stock exchange for two days and took 
control of the country’s largest bank— 
the third to be placed under its protective 
custody as Iceland struggles to bring its 
economy back from the brink.
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proposals on executive compensation and 
dividend payouts, as well as safeguards to 
ensure that the government investments 
would go toward lending. 
The second part of this plan committed 
£250 billion to guarantee short- to medium- 
term debt issuance by financial institutions.  
For those institutions that do raise a suf-
ficient amount of Tier 1 capital, the govern-
ment would use this guarantee program to 
help refinance any prior debt or financing 
obligations that may be maturing.  The aim 
of this part of the plan is to make funding 
costs cheaper to banks.
The third part of this plan involved the 
Bank of England’s increase in funds avail-
able through its Special Liquidity Scheme 
(SLS) to £200 billion.  Designed by the Bank 
of England, the SLS enables British financial 
institutions to swap illiquid assets in return 
for Treasury bills, which are generally more-
liquid assets.  Through the amended SLS 
program, the Bank of England would swap 
British pounds for three months and U.S. 
dollars for one week against the collateral 
that financial institutions put forward.
An additional element in the U.K.’s regu-
latory structure is the Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FSA).  Set up in the late 1990s, 
the FSA is an independent agency in charge 
of regulating all financial services firms.  
Like Iceland’s FME, the FSA has a mandate 
to supervise all financial services firms and 
financial markets as a whole.  The Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) is 
an independent body set up by the British 
government in 2000 to cover deposits of an 
insolvent financial institution.  Similar to 
the FDIC in the U.S., it guarantees consum-
ers up to 100 percent of the first £50,000,  
as well as guarantees for some investments 
and insurance.
Despite handling claims from lost deposits 
in Icelandic banks, the FSCS did not create 
broad guarantees or funding instruments as 
did its American counterpart, the FDIC.  Nor 
did legislators expand the scope of deposit 
guarantees, as was the case in the U.S.
Conclusion
In terms of size, scope and regulatory 
structure, the three countries described in 
this article are very different.  Yet one com-
mon factor is the decentralized nature of 
financial regulation.  A number of sepa-
rate institutions exist to carry out specific 
functions.  Yet in the face of crisis, these 
organizations were able to work together 
to form cohesive national responses.  The 
financial crisis in each country, though 
disproportionate in size relatively speaking, 
was national in scope  
for all three.  This required, and got, all 
significant government entities to work 
together to produce a swift and strong 
response.  As policymakers around the 
world consider financial market reforms, 
these experiences should be kept in mind. 
Rajeev Bhaskar and Yadav Gopalan are research 
associates at the Federal Reserve Bank of  
St. Louis.
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Supervisory Authority—Iceland at www.fme.
is/?PageID=157.
 
4  See Central Bank of Iceland. 
 
5  See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis time-
line for complete perspective on the chain  
of events.
 
6  OECD (Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development) country data.  See 
http://stats.oecd.org/WBOS/index.aspx.
 
7  U.K. Treasury’s rescue plan can be found at  
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_100_08.htm.  
See, too, www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_ 
support_lending.htm.
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